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Gas Processing & LNG

We calibrated on your sweetening train. It is about a tenth of the plant.

Acid gas removal is where this platform was built, tested and proven: a real train, thirteen days of one-minute history, twenty-two named faults. But the method underneath it is not amine chemistry. Dehydration, NGL recovery, refrigeration and the liquefaction train fail in ways a physics reference model is built to catch — and in LNG each of them is measured in millions a day.

524.5Million tonnes a year of LNG liquefaction capacity worldwide, end-2025
+40%Forecast growth in liquefaction capacity between 2025 and 2030
7–15%Of LNG feed gas energy is consumed by liquefaction itself
> $5 mGross loss from one day of unplanned downtime on a mid-scale train

SOURCEDIGU 2025 World LNG Report · IEA LNG capacity tracker · US EIA · published LNG value-chain downtime analysis. Every figure on this page is linked at the foot of it.

Part one — the capability

What a platform built this way does across a gas plant.

The engine does not know it is looking at amine. It compares what the plant is doing against what physics says a healthy unit should be doing, ranks the gaps, names the cause behind each one and prices the consequence. Every block below is that same loop pointed at a different unit — which is why extending it is calibration work rather than invention.

Calibrated here

Amine sweetening and solvent regeneration

What goes wrongFoaming, absorber flooding, lean/rich exchanger fouling, reboiler scaling and corrosion, filter plugging, pump cavitation.

What comes back22 named faults, each with the root cause behind it, the evidence that fired, and the cost per hour of leaving it alone. CO₂ slip caught before it reaches the cold box, H₂S before it reaches a specification.

Next — calibration work

Dehydration and the mercury guard

What goes wrongGlycol carryover and losses, regeneration temperature drift, molecular sieve capacity decay, breakthrough earlier than the cycle assumed.

What comes backBed capacity against design capacity, how many cycles are genuinely left, and how much dry-gas margin stands between the plant and water in the cold box.

Next — calibration work

NGL recovery and fractionation

What goes wrongTurboexpander performance decay, column flooding, reflux and reboiler imbalance, product specification drift between the C2 and C3 cuts.

What comes backRecovery against modelled recovery, with the shortfall attributed to a machine, a column or a feed change — and priced per hour rather than argued at the morning meeting.

Wider plant

Refrigeration and liquefaction

What goes wrongMixed refrigerant composition drift, cold box fouling and approach loss, compressor surge margin, driver limits, ambient-driven derate.

What comes backSpecific power against the model at today’s ambient conditions — which separates a hot afternoon from real degradation, something a trend line comparing this week to last cannot do.

Wider plant

Compression, rotating equipment and utilities

What goes wrongSeal gas systems, anti-surge control fighting the machine, fouled coolers, lube oil, fuel gas quality and the steam and power that everything else depends on.

What comes backWhich constraint is actually binding right now, how far the train is from it, and what the distance is worth per hour of run time.

Wider plant

Flare, boil-off and methane losses

What goes wrongBoil-off gas handled by habit, losses estimated rather than measured, and a methane intensity figure assembled by hand for buyers who increasingly audit it.

What comes backModelled against measured balances across the plant, so a loss has a location and a methane intensity number has a derivation a buyer’s auditor can follow.

One answer, four audiences

The same diagnosis has to serve the console and the board.

A finding only a specialist can read gets ignored; a finding only a manager can read gets distrusted. Because every call is denominated in both engineering units and money, one output serves everybody without being rewritten.

The board operator

One ranked list at the start of a shift, in plant units, with the evidence attached. Not four hundred alarms and a colour.

The process engineer

The residual against expected-healthy, the indicators that fired, the ones that corroborate, and the ones that would have ruled the fault out. Something concrete to disagree with.

Reliability and maintenance

Which item is degrading, how quickly, and what each week of delay costs. Cleaning and outage scope argued from a number instead of from a habit.

Planning, economics and HSE

Energy and losses per unit, priced daily. The margin review and the emissions report draw on one model, so they stop disagreeing with each other.

Part two — the market

A capital-intensive industry where one lost day costs more than a decade of software.

LNG is the clearest form of the argument on this page. The assets are enormous, the instrumentation is complete, and the operating decisions are still made from trend screens and a morning meeting. On the left is how the industry handles its measurements today. On the right is what independent studies say that habit costs.

How the data is handled today

  • A single train historises tens of thousands of tags at one-second resolution and keeps them for years.
  • Less than 1% of what is collected reaches the people who make decisions — McKinsey’s finding on instrumented oil and gas operations.
  • Performance is judged by comparing today with last week, not against what the machine should be doing at today’s ambient temperature.
  • Alarm rates on unrationalised consoles run an order of magnitude above the EEMUA 191 guideline of roughly six an hour. That is volume, not diagnosis.
  • Cold box and compressor degradation is found at the scheduled inspection, or on the first warm day the train cannot make rate.
  • Machine-learning pilots return a score nobody will sign, because the model cannot say why it said so.

What that leaves on the table

  • > $5 m a dayGross loss from unplanned downtime on a mid-scale 3–6 mtpa liquefaction train, before any take-or-pay exposure.
  • 7–15% of feedThe energy liquefaction consumes. One point off specific power is one point more saleable LNG, permanently.
  • $0.30–0.50 / bblWhat end-to-end optimisation of yield, energy and throughput is worth in comparable hydrocarbon processing (McKinsey).
  • +40% by 2030Liquefaction capacity growth to 2030. Every new train commissions with no failure history at all — the exact case a physics model handles and a statistical one cannot.
  • Weeks, not hoursHow long a staged LNG restart can take after an unplanned trip. Most of the value is in the trip that never happens.

To put one number on itOne avoided day of unplanned downtime on a mid-scale train is over $5 million in gross production, before take-or-pay. A platform that prevents a single trip in a year has returned its cost many times over on that one event — and the trip worth preventing is usually the one whose cause was sitting in the data for a week beforehand.

Why this and not another dashboard

Four things a physics model does that a pattern-matcher cannot.

WORKS FROM DAY ONE

A statistical model has to be shown the fault before it can find it. A physics reference model needs equipment datasheets. On a unit that has never failed inside its recorded history — which is most units, and every new-build — only one of those two is any use.

EXPLAINS ITSELF

Every diagnosis carries the indicators that fired, the ones that corroborate it, and the ones that would have ruled it out. An engineer can argue with it. That is the only reason anyone in a control room ever acts on it.

ENDS IN MONEY

Six consequences are priced directly, so a finding arrives as a cost per hour rather than a severity colour. The same output serves the operator, the planner and the board without being rewritten for each.

PORTS BY CALIBRATION

The cost of the next unit is datasheets, a tag list and a fitting pass — not a new product. That is the whole scaling argument: the platform grows by calibration, and calibration is the cheapest thing in this business to change.

The path from the calibrated unit

One unit is proven. The rest is calibration.

Each stage below reuses the same engine and the same knowledge-base structure. What changes is the unit it is fitted to — and that is deliberately the cheapest thing in this business to change.

  1. 1

    Today — the sweetening train, calibrated and running

    Fitted against an operating amine gas sweetening train with thirteen days of one-minute history: 26 equipment items, 161 tags, 22 faults, 19 root causes, 54 indicators, 6 costed consequences. Calibration is fitted on the training history; single-point diagnoses run on data the model has never seen, and the separation is enforced in the code.

  2. 2

    The rest of the treating and conditioning block

    Inlet separation, dehydration and the mercury guard. Same solvent-and-adsorbent physics, same fouling and capacity questions, and units we can already describe from datasheets. This step is calibration and knowledge-base work, not new science.

  3. 3

    NGL recovery and fractionation

    Columns, exchangers and the turboexpander. Recovery against modelled recovery is a heat and mass balance question, which is what a reference model is for — and it is where the difference between a good month and a bad one usually hides.

  4. 4

    The cold end — refrigeration, liquefaction and the machines that drive it

    Specific power, approach temperatures, surge margin and ambient correction, reporting into one objective function denominated in money. At that point the platform is not a monitoring tool. It is how the train decides what to do next.

Being straight about it

What this page is not claiming.

  • The amine sweetening train is the only unit calibrated today. Everything else on this page is the same method applied to units we have documented but not yet fitted, and we would rather say so here than let you find it later.
  • The market figures above are third-party estimates for the LNG and gas processing industry. They size an opportunity. They are not results we have measured, and we do not present them as ours.
  • Each new unit needs equipment datasheets, a tag list and enough history to fit against. That is engineering work measured in weeks — not a configuration screen, and not a model you point at a historian and leave running.

See it working on the unit you already run.

The platform runs on a real amine train with thirteen days of one-minute history behind it — live diagnosis, ranked evidence, root causes and cost per hour. Ten minutes in it says more about whether this extends to the cold end than any slide can.

Sources

The industry figures on this page are public and third-party. The amine figures — 22 faults, 19 root causes, 54 indicators, 6 costed consequences, thirteen days of one-minute history — are ours, and are countable in the platform.